the DYNAMIC FUTURE OF NATO

VOL. 20, No. 18, OCTOBER 6, 1977

COMMANDERS DIGEST

WORLD FREEDOM AND THE PROMISE OF

The flags of NATO allies portray the strength needed to deter an enemy force.

NATO

BY
DR. HAROLD BROWN
Secretary of Defense

I need hardly rehearse the value of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to U.S. security. To oversimplify, the United States is able to feel secure with only two million men under arms because the three-million-man armed forces of our allies permit us to balance the somewhat more than five million men in Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact forces.

Since the importance to us of NATO is so clear, it is essential to assure that it remains as effective in its second 25 years as it was in its first in deterring war in Europe—and to do that, it has to be able to fight war credibly.

In those first 25 years NATO depended mainly on U.S. nuclear deterrent superiority. Any move against Alliance forces would have risked nuclear disaster for the attacker. Today, we need a more flexible response. Our nuclear forces remain a key element in the deterrent, but in an era of nuclear equivalence we must also have a credible level of conventional defense. We must not let ourselves get into a position where conventional thrusts might penetrate rapidly into NATO territory in a way that would compromise both conventional and nuclear defense.

I am convinced that an adequate conventional leg of the NATO Tripod of strategic, theater nuclear and conventional forces is within our reach, if we work hard at it. The defense has a considerable advantage if it is ready and properly equipped. We need not match the enemy tank for tank. If properly managed, new techniques for target acquisition, delivery systems, and precision guidance should make our task of defense even easier. We can adequately meet the threat of short warning attack. We can retain a qualitative edge. And we can do all this at a cost the allies can readily afford if all the members of the Alliance pull together more effectively than before.

But if we are to do so, we must concentrate on three key tasks.

First, we must place our forces in the high state of readiness necessary to respond quickly to any threatening movement by Warsaw Pact forces. This task involves surmounting the obstacles outlined in the U.S. Senate's January 1977 report, "NATO and the New Soviet Threat."

Second, NATO must be able to move its reinforcements more quickly into position. This task is complicated by the fact that half of our Alliance team has its home base more than 3,000 miles away in the United States.

Third, we must make our separate national forces able to work

DEFENSE NEWS BRIEFS

All Herbicide Orange Destroyed

The Air Force has completed the destruction of its entire stock of 2.3 million gallons of Herbicide Orange by incineration at sea off Johnson Island in the Pacific. The latest burning, as well as two previous burns of the Herbicide Orange defoliant, was conducted with approval of the Environmental Protection Agency.

NATO Maneuver

DISPLAY DETERMINATION 77, an exercise from Sept. 19-Oct. 7 in NATO's southern region, involves air, land, and naval elements from Italy, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Some highlights involve a naval defense of the straits of Gibraltar, amphibious landings in Turkey, and the movement of a Brigade-size force from the 1st Armored Division in Germany to Italy.

AWACS Slightly Delayed

E-3A AWACS production models have encountered a one-month delay because of hydraulic line problems found in two aircraft already delivered to Tinker AFB, Okla. Air Force expects the fix to occur soon enough to allow deliveries to be resumed in October but says the delay will cause some impairment of aircrew training. AWACS, or Airborne Warning and Control System, represents the latest development in airborne surveillance and command and control.

TEXAS Sails Again

The Navy's seventh nuclear powered guided missile cruiser TEXAS (CGN-39) was commissioned on Sept. 10 at Norfolk, Va. The third ship to bear this name, the TEXAS is capable of operating independently or with nuclear powered or conventional strike forces.

State Income Tax Withholding

Three more states—Maine, Minnesota, Oregon—will begin on Nov. 1 to withhold State income taxes from the military pay of their residents.

These three join 24 other States which require withholding of State income taxes. Some States have laws which require State income taxes but not withholding, and others exempt military pay from State income taxes.

Information about specific States is available from legal assistance officers.

SBP Changes For Reservists

Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) changes for Reservists and National Guardsmen have been proposed to Congress.

DoD wants "to provide survivor protection to the spouse, spouse and children, children alone, or persons with insurable interests, of Reservists who have completed 20 years of satisfactory Federal service but who have not yet reached age 60."

Unlike their active duty counterparts, Reservists who have served 20 or more creditable years receive no benefits unless or until they reach age 60.

Richard G. Altmann, Director of the Reserve Compensation System Study, told a House Armed Services Subcommittee on Sept. 16 that the proposal is based on a premise of no additonal cost to the Government, and he cited the increasing interest among young Reservists about SBP coverage in "reaching stay-in or get-out decision points in their Reserve careers."

efficiently together in a true coalition defense. We need the flexibility to move forces rapidly to the most threatened point and to fight as an effective allied fighting team, which means greater interoperability if not standardization. All this will give us what NATO really seeks—high confidence deterrence.

As you know, the new U.S. Administration has launched a major set of initiatives to strengthen NATO's deterrent posture along these lines. They are based on a detailed action program which I had prepared immediately upon taking office. President Carter, at the NATO Summit Meeting in May, proposed that the allies join us in this new effort to strengthen Alliance deterrence and defense in the 1980s. He called for both high priority short-term improvements in Alliance forces and for development of a long-term NATO defense program to insure coordinated national efforts throughout the coming decade. Finally, he emphasized the importance of improved cooperation in development, production and procurement of standardized Alliance defense equipment.

Following the mandate of the heads of government, we defense ministers agreed at Brussels a week later to outline key short-term defense improvements and to develop a long-term defense program, to include greater interoperability of standardization of defense equipment, by the spring of 1978. I am happy to report that these actions are well underway.

SHORT-TERM INITIATIVES

We defense ministers tasked the NATO military authorities with developing recommendations for early Alliance improvements in three key areas—Readiness and Reinforcement, Guided Antitank Munitions, and War Reserve Ammunitions Stocks. These proposals have now been forwarded to allied capitals and the resulting national programs should be approved at our next ministerial session in December. Preliminary indications of national acceptance seem quite favorable. The result should be visible and meaningful improvements in these high priority areas by the end of 1978.

The Readiness and Reinforcement measures proposed include accelerated reinforcement by the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, and improved reception and onward movement of these forces by nations on the continent. In addition, most nations are being asked to improve the efficiency of their mobilization machinery, enhance training programs for reservists and increase the manning levels of their active duty forces. These readiness improvements will be tested in Alliance exercises, which

Refueling at sea is necessary to maintain a continued security.



have been expanded during the last few years to test the ability of national forces to work together in a combat environment. The AUTUMN FORGE exercise series initiated by the Supreme Allied Command, Europe (SACEUR) should serve as a key vehicle for testing readiness and reinforcement measures. Our own participation includes the REFORGER exercise which tests our ability to deploy major combat units to Europe and to work with our allies in a simulated combat environment once we get there.

With respect to Guided Antitank Munitions, particular attention is being paid to reducing existing disparities between the actual holdings of individual nations. Included in the proposed anti-armor measures are procurement of a substantial number of tube-launched, optically tracked wire-guided (TOW) weapons systems, introduction of other medium-range antitank systems in significant quantities, and modernization of range-finding equipment through new technology such as infrared and laser components. Anti-armor measures were designed to deal with the threat implicit in the sheer numbers of armored vehicles which would be brought to bear against NATO defenses.

In War Reserve Ammunition Stocks, the improvements proposed range from a major upgrading of air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions for the newer weapon systems to critically important increases in reserve ammunition for conventional artillery and mortars. Although focused on ammunition supplies, improvements also include such other items as procurement of additional sonobuoys, upgrading of storage facilities and construction of additional forward storage sites to facilitate forward defense.

I shouldn't go into too much detail about these short-term proposals because they have not yet been formally accepted by the allies. They were proposed only recently. But the spirit and enthusiasm with which the Alliance has developed the short-term measures argues well for our overall effort to put Alliance deterrence and defense on a sound long-term basis, which is by far the most important and promising step the Alliance has undertaken.

NATO LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM

At the defense ministers meeting in May, we agreed that the long-term program would consist of a series of carefully selected high-priority programs each of which should:

- Be designed to remedy a serious deficiency in NATO defenses;
- Identify national or multilateral contributions required to remedy the deficiencies, over the long-term as well as mid-term;
- Establish timings for the critical phasing of these contributions;
- Exploit all opportunities to achieve greater interoperability and standardization, and
- Recommend machinery to facilitate greater Allied cooperation in these areas toward a more effective coalition posture.

NATO's Defense Planning Committee has selected 10 long-term priority program areas and established task forces to develop a draft long-term program in each area. The terms of reference just approved for each task force stress the need to project at least 10 years in the future, to establish priorities, to identify cooperative projects which need to be funded in common, and to take into account relevant new technology.

The Readiness Task Force, building on the short-term readiness measures, will further respond to the problems highlighted by the report "NATO and the New Soviet Threat." We expect that this program will increase the responsiveness of standing forces, selected reserve units and civil support in crisis, time of tension, or during hostilities. It will focus on improving NATO's alert machinery, including early commitment of national forces. It will orient the NATO exercise program more heavily to readiness and it will stress improvement in armor/anti-armor capability and in defense against radiological, biological and chemical warfare. It will also seek to identify useful combinations of new weapon systems in areas such as anti-armor and air munitions, which can form the basis of Alliance families of interoperable or standardized equipment.

The Reinforcement Task Force also will build on the short-term measures to further improve the movement and allied reception of strategic reserves from the United States, Canada and United Kingdom. In this connection, the United States has already accelerated the reconstitution of Prepositioned Material Configured to Unit Set (POMCUS) stocks and will probably propose further expansion of these stocks in future budgets, because prepositioning looks like clearly the most cost-effective means of expediting NATO reinforcement. We will also seek further enhancement of badly needed strategic airlift.

The Reserve Mobilization program will be a companion

A Cobra gunship (top) makes a "fly by" on Observation Point 19 at Hohenfels, Germany, while other U.S. Army troops take part in NATO exercises (center and bottom).



Most NATO nations are being asked to improve the efficiency of their mobilization machinery, enhance training programs for Reservists and increase the manning levels of their active duty forces.

piece to the Reinforcement program. We count on it to recommend the quickest and most effective means of mobilizing assigned, earmarked and other reserve forces in organized, equipped and sufficiently trained units capable of deploying in support of standing forces. It will also deal with more rapid mobilization of reservists to bring standing forces up to war strength. Since NATO European reserves would need little deployment to be on the spot, this is a field in which our allies can contribute greatly to improvement in the military balance.

The task force to revamp NATO's Maritime Posture will seek to increase the capability of allied navies to operate as a joint, collective fighting force, including greater interoperability and standardization in communications, munitions, logistics and tactics. It will also recommend measures to meet serious deficiencies in combat capabilities and to improve cooperation in developing new weapons systems.

An Air Defense Task Force will cover all aspects of land-based air defense, coordinating with the Maritime Posture task forces on maritime aspects. Its goal is to achieve the kind of integrated complex of weapons, organization and air command and control systems that is needed to deal effectively with the increasing Warsaw Pact air threat.

A Communications, Command and Control Task Force will aim at an integrated command and control system with greater commonality in doctrine, procedures, organizational structure, personnel, equipment facilities and standardized communications. This is a top priority goal of both SACEUR and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), to enable them and their subordinate commanders to direct and control their forces most efficiently. This is a difficult goal in a very complex field, to which a great deal of effort must be devoted if the allies are to be able to fight optimally together as a coalition.

An Electronic Warfare Task Force will establish priorities for practical long-term improvements in the entire electronic warfare (EW) spectrum of concepts and procedures, intelligence, equipment and systems, standardization and interoperability, manpower, training, management and funding. Electronic warfare is in its infancy, but is likely to be a key factor in our ability to maintain deterrence in the long run.

A special Rationalization Task Force will develop plans and procedures for harmonizing allied research and development (R&D) and armaments production, as is essential for achieving standardization or at least interoperability. It will seek to design a workable periodic armaments planning system, including procedures for preparing NATO "military equipment need statements" and measures for facilitating licensed production and cooperation in all phases of equipment development and procurement. Of course, each of the long-term program task forces will work on specific standardization and interoperability measures in their respective areas.

The Consumer Logistics Task Force will propose an improved NATO logistics structure, steps for better common logistic support of operational plans, and proposals for better civil support of military operations. A great deal needs to be done in these areas, which have been dealt with strictly on a national basis in the past.

NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, which has already devoted substantial study to Theater Nuclear Force Modernization, will develop a draft long-term program to insure that our theater nuclear forces continue to perform their key role in deterrence.

A great deal is underway in NATO, though at this point it is only a promising beginning. We look at development of a long-term defense program as offering great potential for improvement in NATO defense capabilities by drawing together more effectively current national efforts and redirecting them as necessary. Its development is an unprecedented undertaking. NATO has never tried to look so far ahead before. Nor has it attempted to deal with broad defense problems as an entity—treating not only forces but their required support, whether NATO or national. So it



Taking part in an exercise in Germany, a soldier stays ready as he aims his assault rifle from an attic window.

is a new departure. The draft programs to be reviewed next spring will hardly solve Alliance defense problems for all time. Even if most allies accept them in general, subsequent implementation will require constant monitoring and consistent long-term efforts by the nations themselves.

Nonetheless the NATO long-term program should provide invaluable guidelines for national programming and national support of NATO programs. Even this is a tall order, but we are determined to make it work, to achieve a second 25 years of peaceful deterrence for the Alliance.

The Department of Defense is doing all it can to support NATO. For example, we have set up parallel U. S. task forces to provide U. S. long-term program inputs to their NATO counterparts. Beyond this, I have initiated a series of measures to revamp our own DoD organization and programming to enhance our NATO contribution. We are strengthening our focus on NATO-oriented activities in relevant DoD and Service components. The Service secretaries and I have tasked key civilian and uniformed managers to supervise this effort. In our programs we are stressing greater readiness, stronger anti-armor and artillery capabilities, faster reinforcement and the like.

Both our own programs and NATO's are paying attention to almost all of the measures proposed earlier this year by Congress. For example, we and our allies plan steps to reduce the present imbalance between Northern Area Group (NORTHAG) and Central Area Group (CENTAG). We have already done much to rectify readiness deficiencies, such as lack of sufficient uploading of ammunition.

COMPATIBILITY

The NATO long-term program exercise will focus heavily on identifying standardization and interoperability of equipment needs and opportunities, and on machinery and procedures to carry them out in practice. This will demand greater "give" on all sides—between us and our allies and on the part of Congress and parliaments, and U. S. and allied industry too—in the interests of the common defense.

For my part, I have requested the Services to examine and report to me on the opportunities they see for more common R&D, greater interoperability and standardization, and for buying, licensing or co-producing European as well as U.S. equipment to create more of a two-way street. We are actively studying which areas of commonality would have the highest payoff, and our tentative conclusions are that interchangeability of munitions and common or compatible C^3 would make a particularly great contribution to stronger Alliance defense. In short, we are actively following President Carter's call—and that of the Congress—for greater Alliance cooperation in developing and producing NATO defense equipment.

But let me inject a few words of caution here. Standardization and interoperability, desirable as they are, are not a panacea. Many other problems being tackled by us and by NATO in the long-term defense program are equally essential. Moreover, compatibility of doctrine, tactics, and procedures, logistic commonality, combined training and exercises and other similar measures are just as important as standardized or interoperable equipment.

Moreover, as the Deputy Secretary of Defense told a Congress subcommittee recently, all this will take time. And the United States cannot do it alone; we need cooperation from our allies. Achieving the degree of commonality which the common interest demands will take an extended period. The national parochialism and vested interests which have so limited Alliance success in the past still present enormous obstacles.

To illustrate the dimensions of the problem, following are a few of the obstacles we confront:

- Fear of losing jobs to foreign competitors. Europeans have a similar concern, and we have strong indications European producers will insist on maintaining their own R&D and production base—whether or not they choose to build American designs. Consequently, the question of Europeans' building part of the American-designed F-16 fighter, for example, is not as germane as how many Americans would be working on the F-16 had Denmark, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Norway chosen

a different, non-U. S. design. In addition, with licensed production encouraged by both Congress and the Executive Branch there need be no automatic loss of U. S. jobs simply because U. S. workers build a European design. A more efficient Alliance R&D and production system should increase job levels by providing the resources to procure the additional weapons that NATO badly needs.

- Protecting Technology. U. S. defense technology is usually paid for by U. S. taxpayers. Consequently, improved Alliance defense should govern our policy. We should release technology consistent with security, tying its release to improved standardization and interoperability, and expecting our NATO partners to reciprocate.
- Sales to Third Countries. European allies, particularly arms exporters such as France and the United Kingdom, are sensitive to entering into cooperative projects wherein all make contributions but the U.S. reserves a veto on sales to third countries (whether within or outside NATO). Congress and the Executive Branch both have a strong interest in restraining arms transfers. However, it would be useful to establish clearly at the outset of a cooperative program just what the limitations on transfer are. We should recognize that to eliminate or overly restrain allied sales would preclude much of the collaboration necessary to achieve NATO standardization goals.

Broad standardization in particular cannot be achieved at any early date because many allies have already spent huge sums of money on existing systems and those in advanced development that cannot be efficiently discarded in the short run. Indeed complete standardization is not essential in many cases. Interoperability, which is much easier to achieve, should suffice. Moreover, it is a desirable halfway house to eventual standardization.

Elements of an infantry division cross the Rhein River near Dienheim, West Germany during a recent operation which involved some 10,000 personnel and 3,000 vehicles representing military units from Germany, Belgium, Great Britain and the United States.

Nor should we expect large-scale early cost savings through standardization. Single country R&D and single source procurement for the whole Alliance might save extensive resources, but this ultimate efficiency is not likely to come about, at least in the short run. Licensed production, co-production, and cooperative development may save some resources when we become more efficient in their use, but they will not produce the same savings as completely specialized production. Nevertheless, these more feasible methods of cooperation will contribute to the improved Alliance defense capabilities that we badly need.

In any case, this Administration is determined to make a far greater effort than any of its predecessors to achieve greater commonality and more of a two-way street. In fact, I think we have already done so in our first six months in office. The NATO initiatives I have described are one evidence of our good faith. There will be more evidence in our FY 1979 budget proposals, which I am now reviewing. In addition, the Defense Department and NATO have launched actions to advance NATO standardization and interoperability.

New Directive

In March, I directed DoD components to seek standardization and interoperability of NATO weapon systems and equipment on a priority basis in order to conserve equipment and increase the combined combat capability of U. S. and NATO forces. The directive assigned broad implementing responsibilities to the military departments and staffs. In sum, we will give our NATO allies a fair chance to compete in fulfilling U. S. military equipment needs.

This U.S. soldier is prepared to man his position as he takes part in a NATO exercise.

The NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is investigating procedures for creating a Periodic Armaments Planning System (PAPS). NATO members already have provided five-year equipment replacement lists and descriptions of their arms procurement procedures. The success of PAPS or some related institutionalized process for planning and programming key NATO research and development and procurement is basic to more efficient resource allocations within the Alliance.

Agreement on doctrine and specific requirements ideally precedes standardized equipment. Yet it is difficult to get different services in one

While NATO assembly is in session (top left), U.S. Air Force F-4 fighter aircraft (bottom), and U.S. Army units (top right) take part in exercises.

country—much less 15 sovereign states—to agree on how a future war might be fought. In 1966, NATO acknowledged inability to agree unanimously on what were then termed NATO basic military requirements. Recently the Defense Department's Rationalization/Standardization Steering Group has proposed a system whereby military equipment needs, determined by NATO military authorities, might be blended with CNAD planning efforts.

Increased standardization frequently depends on removing barriers which restrict one ally from licensing production of another's design. Among NATO allies there are widely different patterns of controlling patents and property rights. For the United States, typically the government owns defense-oriented technology. In Europe, private ownership is more often the rule. This year we have supported increased activity within an existing CNAD group, AC-94. We are pointing toward ways for allies to share industrial property rights at reasonable costs, thereby providing an important incentive for commonality of production by both sides of the Atlantic.

Ad Hoc Committee

A high-level committee of the North Atlantic Council has focused ministerial attention on interoperability in five critical areas:

- communications;
- aircraft rearming;
- tank ammunitions;
- fuels, and
- standardization agreements.

This activity, which involves France, has brought at least limited successes. The allies already have accepted standard naval fuels. We are improving our ability to rearm and service each other's aircraft when they land away from home. We are working to standardize high-usage items such as ammunition and fuels for land-based aircraft. And we are trying to ensure that future communications systems will be

COVER:
NATO maintains peace through a high state of readiness.

Vol. 20, No. 18
October 6, 1977

A publication of the Department of Defense to provide official and professional information to commanders and key personnel on matters related to Defense policies, programs and interests, and to create better understanding and teamwork within the Department of Defense.

Published bi-weekly by the American Forces Press Service, 1117 N. 19th St., Arlington, Va. 22209, a unified activity of the American Forces Information Service, OASD (PA). Reproduction of content is authorized.

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interoperable. We are making special proposals on this last one to NATO this year.

In concluding, let me acknowledge that even all the preceding actions are only a beginning—though I believe a promising one. The United States has always been looked to by the allies to take the lead in NATO, because we are the largest partner. I submit that we have again assumed leadership by proposing the short-term and long-term action programs in which our NATO allies have joined.

We also intend to take the lead in the equipment commonality process, because more of a two-way street in defense design and procurement is imperative to overcome deep European suspicions that standardization and interoperability really mean "Buy American" in our eyes. We must "give" more in the sense of buying some European systems and loosening some restraints on technology transfer and licensing. But we expect to gain far more in terms of the total strength of the Alliance. Achieving all this must be a joint endeavor of the Congress and the Executive—as well as our allies.

NATO COMMANDS

Allied Command Europe (ACE), Headquarters: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium (Near Mons). Commands subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR):

- **Allied Forces Northern Europe:** Kolsaas, Norway. This command comprises: Allied Forces North Norway; Allied Forces South Norway; and Allied Forces Baltic Approaches.
- **Allied Forces Central Europe:** Brunssum, Netherlands. This command comprises: Northern Army Group; Central Army Group; Allied Air Forces Central Europe; 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force and 4th Allied Tactical Air Force.
- **Allied Forces Southern Europe:** Naples, Italy. This command comprises: Allied Land Forces Southern Europe; Allied Land Forces South-Eastern Europe; Allied Forces Southern Europe; Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe; Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe.
- **U.K. Air Forces Command;** High Wycombe, United Kingdom.
- **Allied Command Europe Mobile Force:** Seckenheim, Germany.

Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), Headquarters: Norfolk, Va., U.S.A. Commands subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT):

- **Western Atlantic Command.** This command comprises: a Submarine Force Western Atlantic Area; an Ocean Sub-Area; a Canadian Atlantic Sub-Area; and the Bermuda, Azores and Greenland Island Commands.
- **Eastern Atlantic Command.** This command comprises: Maritime Air Eastern Atlantic Area; Northern Sub-Area; Maritime Air Northern Sub-Area; Central Sub-Area; Maritime Air Central Sub-Area; Submarine Force Eastern Atlantic Area; and the Island Commanders of Iceland and the Faeroes.
- **Striking Fleet Atlantic Command.** This command comprises: a Carrier Striking Force, and the Carrier Striking Groups One and Two.
- **Submarines Allied Command Atlantic.**
- **Iberian Atlantic Command.** This includes the Island Command of Madeira.
- **Standing Naval Force Atlantic**—afloat.

Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN), Headquarters: Northwood, United Kingdom. Commands subordinate to the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Channel Command:

- **Nore Channel Command.**
- **Plymouth Channel Command.**
- **Benelux Channel Command.**
- **Allied Maritime Air Force Channel command.**
- **Standing Naval Force Channel** (Mine Counter Measures)—afloat.

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Subscription Price: $17.00 domestic per year; $4.00 additional for foreign mailing; 65 cents per single copy.
☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 240-827/V-10